A bilateral trading model with investment is considered. In a "cooperative" investment version of the model, the seller's investment stochastically determines the buyer's valuation of the good. The value and cost of the good are realized only after the investment is made, and the investment level and the realization of the good's value and cost are private information. I show that, under these assumptions, no contract made before the investment can simultaneously induce efficient investment and efficient ex post trade when the buyer's type is continuously distributed. This inefficiency result contrasts sharply with the efficiency result under the standard "selfish" investment model, where the seller's investment stochastically determines the seller's cost.
Introduction
Consider the following interaction between a buyer and a seller. The buyer is interested in obtaining one unit of a good that the seller can produce. The seller makes an investment which stochastically determines the buyer's valuation of the good; in this sense the investment is "cooperative". The good is traded after its value and cost are realized.
This paper poses the question, when the seller's investment level is unobservable and the good's value and cost are private information, of whether the first-best outcome (defined as simultaneous efficient investment and efficient allocation) is possible. This problem is not trivial. If the investment problem is absent, efficient trade is achievable because, unlike in Myerson and Satterthwaite's (1983) study, there is no interim individual rationality.
1 Furthermore, if the good's value and cost are not private information, efficient investment is attainable.
It is shown that, under a "cooperative" investment environment, no efficiency-inducing contract exists when the buyer's valuation is distributed continuously. The inefficiency result is due to the existence of two problems: first, the buyer must have an incentive to tell the truth in order to achieve efficient allocation, and, second, the seller must have a sufficient incentive to achieve efficient investment. To elicit true information, the seller must pay information rent to the buyer when the buyer and the seller trade the good with positive probability. Because expected information rent increases in the seller's investment, the seller cannot get the whole marginal return on it, which implies that the seller underinvests. Schmitz (2002a) studied a model in which the buyer's valuation of the good is distributed discretely. In this environment, information rent is unnecessary for truth telling when only the buyer with the highest valuation obtains the good. Thus, if the seller's cost lies between the buyer's highest and second highest valuation, the first-best outcome is achievable. This is the only case in which the first-best outcome is possible when investment is "cooperative". Otherwise, the first-best outcome is not attainable because of the necessity of information rent.
This inefficiency result contrasts sharply with the efficiency result under the standard "selfish" investment model, where the seller's investment stochastically determines the seller's cost. In this standard model, an efficient mechanism exists, as in Konakayama et al. (1986) and Rogerson (1992) ; moreover, Schmitz (2002b) showed that the first-best outcome is achievable through a simple contract and renegotiation.
Several papers have analyzed this problem in a complete information framework. Che and Hausch (1999) showed that, in a cooperative investment model, an efficient outcome may not be attainable if parties cannot commit to refusing renegotiation. In contrast, in a selfish investment model under the same assumptions, the first-best outcome may be achievable (Nöldeke and Schmidt 1995, Edlin and Reichelstein 1996) . However, very few analyses have used an incomplete information framework. This paper provides insights into the cooperative investment model when the investment level and the realization of the good's value and cost are private information.
Model
Consider a buyer (B) and a seller (S), both of whom are risk neutral. In the initial period, t = 0, they agree to a contract specifying the allocation of one unit of an indivisible good and the associated monetary transfer that satisfies a balanced-budget constraint. At time t = 1, the seller chooses the investment level. The investment level stochastically determines the realization of the buyer's valuation of the good at time t = 2 as follows. Suppose the seller chooses an investment level, e ∈ E ⊂ . The cost of investment is represented by ψ(e), where ψ e ≥ 0 and ψ ee > 0. Then the buyer's valuation,
is realized according to the distribution function F (v|e).
The distribution function is first-order stochastic dominant, with F e (v|e) ≤ 0 and F e (v|e) < 0 for some v. The seller's production cost, c ∈ C ⊂ , 2 is also realized at time t = 2, according to distribution function G(c). Note that this cost does not depend on the investment level, and thus the investment is "cooperative". It is assumed that sup V > inf C.
suggests that there is no loss of generality in restricting our attention to direct mechanisms. The allocation and transfer rules are contingent on the reports from the buyer,ṽ ∈ V , and the seller,c ∈ C. The contract can be contingent on the seller's report on investment level, but this is useless because investment does not satisfy the single crossing property. Then the utilities of the buyer and the seller after time t = 2 are given by
The efficient allocation is then
Intuitively, this condition states that the buyer obtains the good only if his or her valuation exceeds the seller's cost. Note that this condition does not depend on the investment level. There always exists some valuation-cost pair (v, c) for which q * (v, c) = 1 because sup V > inf C.
The Inefficiency Result
This section investigates the seller's investment incentive given an incentive compatible allocation rule. Consider an allocation rule, q = q(v, c), which is strictly positive for some (v, c) . To achieve this allocation ex post, the allocation and transfer rules must satisfy the following incentive compatibility constraints at time t = 3:
Given an allocation rule, q, let e † (q) be the efficient investment level.
This assumption precludes irrelevant cases: for example, f e (v|e) = 0 for all v such that C q (v, c) 
Assumption 2. The efficient investment level, e † (q), satisfies the first-order condition
This assumption is met when F ee ≥ 0 and C = {c}, for example. Proof. The proof proceeds by contradiction. Suppose the contract that implements the investment level e ≥ e † (q) exists, then the contract should satisfy incentive compatibility conditions and
The buyer's interim utility at time t = 2 is
From incentive compatibility condition (1), and applying the envelope theorem, this interim utility is
Integrating by parts, the expected transfer is
vq(v, c)g(c)f(v|e) − q(v, c)g(c){1 − F (v|e)}dcdv − u B (v). (4)
The seller's expected utility at time t = 1 is
and, by substituting (4),
The seller's investment maximizes the above expected utility; hence, the first-order condition satisfies
The second part of the left hand side is strictly negative. If it were not, i.e. F e (v) = 0 for almost all {v| C q(v, c)g(c)dc > 0}, then f e (v|e) = 0 for almost all {v| C q(v, c)g(c)dc > 0}, and the lowest investment would be efficient, which is the case precluded by the assumption. Hence,
contradicting (3). The second line of the proposition is immediate from applying the above result for the efficient allocation q * .
Why does the seller underinvest? When v is high, the seller has to pay high information rent to the buyer. First-order stochastic dominance means that when the seller invests, the probability of realizing high v is large. Because the seller wants to increase the transfer (reduce the payment of information rent), he or she chooses the low investment level.
Some comments are in order. First, uncertainty about c is not essential for the inefficiency result. Second, as no assumption on the ex post bargaining stage has been made, the result holds for all incentive-compatible allocation and transfer rules.
The Second-best Contract
This section characterizes the second-best contract. For simplicity, it is assumed that there is no uncertainty about the seller's cost, C = {c}.
The following problem, which maximizes the social surplus, is considered.
Let e S be the second-best investment level.
Assumption 3. The second-best investment, e S , satisfies the first-order condition
The first-order approach is met, for example, when F ee ≥ 0, e ∈ [0, ∞) and ψ e (0) = 0. Furthermore, the assumption precludes a corner solution. In this case, the second-best investment is e S = inf E and the second-best allocation is q(v) = q * (v), because only allocation efficiency matters. Given the assumption, the first two constraints are equivalent to the monotonicity condition, q(v) ≥ q(v ) when v > v , and
as shown in the previous section. Let λ be the Lagrange multiplier for (6), then the Hamiltonian is
where λ ≥ 0. Because the Hamiltonian is linear in q, the optimal allocation rule is characterized by a "bang-bang" solution:
where v S is the optimal threshold. This allocation can be implemented by a simple contract that specifies a simple fixed transfer t S for which trade is to occur. When t S = v S , the buyer whose valuation is v ≥ v S purchases the good from the seller while v < v S does not, thus the simple contract is incentive compatible. Given this, (6) is
and, integrating by part, this is
From (8), the investment level can be written as a function of v S , e = e(v S ). The problem can now be reformulated as
Proposition 2. The optimal threshold, v S , isv > v S ≥ c (the second inequality is strict if F e (c|e) > 0) and a root of
where
Proof. First, show that v S ≥ c. Suppose the contrary, v S < c. From (8), the seller does not have an investment incentive when −(v S − c)F e (v S |e) is strictly negative. So the seller chooses e = inf E. This solution is dominated by v S = c because this alternative induces the same investment level and more efficient allocation. Hence, there is a contradiction.
Next, I characterize the optimal threshold. The derivative of the objective function is
The bracketed term is positive because Proposition 1 says that the second-best investment level is suboptimal. Thus, the problem has a solution,v > v S ≥ c (the second inequality is strict if F e (c|e) > 0), which satisfies the first-order condition.
The implication is as follows. The second term of (7) shows that the information rent increases when v S decreases, so the seller's investment incentive also decreases. The first term of (7) shows the investment incentive from social surplus. When v S decreases, the effect on this term is ambiguous, so total effect on the investment incentive is not clear at this point. But (8) reveals that v S < c cannot provide any investment incentive for the seller, and that this allocation is inefficient; thus, this threshold cannot be the secondbest contract. To provide investment incentive, v S must be greater than c, although this allocation is inefficient. The second-best contract balances this trade-off between investment incentive and allocation efficiency. Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) propose a similar second-best contract. They show that the interim participation constraint and the incentive compatibility constraint are not satisfied simultaneously. In their second-best contract, the good is traded if v exceeds c, to reduce information rent and to satisfy the interim participation constraint. Thus, the second-best allocation is similarly inefficient.
Conclusion
It has been shown that it is impossible to achieve the first-best outcome when the buyer's type is continuously distributed. Intuitively, in a version in which type is discretely distributed, the same result may apply when trade with two or more types is efficient. This result can be extended to the case where both the buyer and seller make cooperative investments. The first-best outcome is generally impossible in this framework; the hold-up problem exists in a complete contract framework.
